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1. Introduction 
 
Microfinance plays an active role as a financial service for the poor in developing 
countries, and is considered a powerful tool in the battle to reduce poverty. Most 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) are socially motivated, and attempt to provide loans to 
the poor (wide outreach) and maximize the number of customers (length outreach). 
Achieving wide outreach in particular can be considered especially important for poverty 
reduction, since credit constraints on the poor is one of the reasons for the deteriorating 
conditions in developing countries. Wide outreach measures how poor-borrower MFIs 
provide loans, and it is a core indicator that recent studies have analyzed. In order to 
increase wide outreach, socially-motivated MFIs take advantage of external subsidies 
and cross-subsidies. Cross-subsidy is the use of gains from profitable borrowers to 
subsidize loans to unprofitable borrowers (McIntosh and Wydick, 2004). Here, we 
suppose that the profitability of clients differs based on their initial wealth, and that the 
widest outreach (loans to the poorest) is the least profitable. The poor tend to have higher 
default rates since they are more susceptible to external shocks. On the other hand, the 
wealthy generally take larger loans, which is more profitable for MFIs through scale 
economies. Therefore, we can conclude that socially-motivated MFIs use the gains from 
wealthier borrowers to subsidize loans to poorer borrowers. Thus, cross-subsidies and 
external subsidies from donors enable socially-motivated MFIs to lend to unprofitable 
poorer borrowers, thereby increasing their wide outreach.  
Recently, however, MFIs have faced difficulties achieving wide outreach. One reason 
is that now, there are many MFIs in the market and competition among MFIs is fierce; 
this affects the cross-subsidization and profitability of MFIs adversely. According to 
McIntosh and Wydick (2004), competition in Bangladesh, East Africa, and Latin 
America is particularly severe. Normally, incumbent MFIs tend to be socially motivated, 
while many newcomers to the MFI market are profit motivated—they attempt to 
maximize profit by entering the market (McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2005; 
Navajas, Conning, and Gonzales-Vega, 2003). Profit-motivated MFIs are willing to enter 
the market where socially-motivated MFIs are already present. This is because they want 
to take advantage of the effect of training and screening already conducted on clients by 
the incumbent lenders. McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2005) show a clustering 
effect and point out that newcomers are willing to enter the market where preexisting 
MFI penetration is high. These recent market entries have affected wide outreach 
adversely.  
Various theoretical analyses have shown that competition has a negative impact on 
financial performance of socially-motivated MFIs and that competition leads to poorer 
borrowers dropping out of the market. However, a conclusive agreement is yet to be 
reached from an empirical perspective. 
Theoretical studies show that intense competition brings (1) a decrease in dynamic 
incentive, (2) a withdrawal of productive borrowers, and (3) a drop in interest rates, 
which deteriorates the profitability and cross-subsidy of MFIs. First, when there are 
numerous MFIs in the market, clients are willing to borrow from multiple 
uncollateralized lenders, and accordingly, the dynamic incentives do not function well 
(Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998), raising the default rate. Dynamic incentive is a useful tool for 
MFIs to let their clients pay back loans, since future loan access is available only if the 
borrowers pay back their original loans. However, if clients can get future loans from 
other lenders, their incentive to pay would fall. Due to a lack of sufficient information 
sharing on clients between MFIs in developing countries, borrowers attempt to borrow 
from multiple sources confidently, causing a rise in the default rate. McIntosh and 
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Wydick (2004) claim that if the competition raises asymmetric information on clients’ 
profiles between MFIs, impatient clients would contract multiple loans and increase the 
total debt excessively, which can further deteriorate the total default rates of MFIs. It can 
be argued that intense competition increases the default rate, which gives rise to a decline 
in the profitability and cross-subsidies of MFIs.  
Second, competition may cause the withdrawal of productive borrowers from 
incumbent MFIs, which reduces their profitability. Profit-motivated newcomer MFIs, 
who target wealthier clients and offer larger loans, enter the market where incumbent 
socially-motivated MFIs, who supply smaller loans, are present. In such a competitive 
environment, profitable borrowers of incumbent socially-motivated MFIs shift to 
newcomer profit-motivated MFIs and ask for larger loans and higher net returns (Navajas, 
Conning, and Gonzales-Vega, 2003). Navajas, Conning, and Gonzales-Vega (2003) 
examined two predominant MFIs in Bolivia: Banco Sol (socially-motivated MFI) and 
Caja Los Andes (profit-motivated MFI) and describe the competition model in which 
Caja Los Andes entered the market where Banco Sol already existed. Their empirical 
results show that profitable, wealthier clients of Banco Sol switched to Caja Los Andes. 
They also indicate that this shift of profitable clients worsens the quality of the portfolio 
of incumbent socially-motivated MFIs. Thus, it can be concluded that competition causes 
a withdrawal of productive clients of socially-motivated MFIs, leading to a decline in 
their profitability and cross-subsidization.  
Finally, if newcomers enter the market, Bertrand competitions may intensify, leading 
to a decline in interest-rate income. McIntosh and Wydick (2004) show that although a 
drop in interest rates makes wealthier borrowers better off, it gives rise to a decline in the 
cross-subsidy of socially-motivated MFIs. From the abovementioned theoretical analyses, 
we could sum up that competition has an adverse impact on cross-subsidization and the 
profit of socially-motivated MFIs. It can be deduced that in order to satisfy budget 
constraints, socially-motivated MFIs need to lessen profitability (financial 
self-sufficiency*) or limit their wide outreach in competitive markets. 
Although the abovementioned theoretical analyses show the negative impact of 
competition on wide outreach, there are few empirical analyses and their results are 
controversial. For example, McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2005) used the biggest 
MFI’s data (Village Bank) in Uganda from Dec 1998 to Aug 2002 and examined how 
competition affects the behavior of borrowers of incumbent village-bank MFIs. Their 
empirical results prove that competition does not have a significant impact on the wide 
outreach. Further, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) used the panel data of 114 MFIs in 62 
countries and demonstrated that there is a significant positive correlation between 
competition and length outreach. However, they did not consider wide outreach. 
Moreover, Olivares-Polanco (2005) used cross-sectional data of 28 MFIs in Latin 
America and demonstrated that competition affects wide outreach adversely. However, 
his OLS empirical result is not convincing, since his empirical model includes ROA 
(return on asset) and length outreach as independent variables without considering the 
endogeneity. Thus, we lack sufficient research information on empirical analyses in this 
field, and the effect of competition on wide outreach is controversial from an empirical 
                                                  
*  According to The Microfinance Information eXchange, Inc (MIX), FSS(financial 
self-sufficiency) is adjusted financial revenue divided by the sum of adjusted financial expense, 
adjusted impairment losses on loan, and adjusted operating expense. Adjustment measurement 
including inflation adjustment, external subsidy adjustment, and loan loss provisioning 
adjustment is to ensure a comparison among MFIs. It shows MFIs’ ability to operate without 
external subsidy (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch, 2007). Further detail can be found at 
http://www.themix.org/. 
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perspective. 
Regarding the possibility that competition may have led to poorer borrowers dropping 
out of the market, there is need for a more detailed empirical analysis. Therefore, this 
paper will mainly analyze the impact of competition on wide outreach and its 
accompanying effect—the impact of competition on FSS (financial self-sufficiency). FSS 
has frequently been used as an indicator of financial performance of MFIs in previous 
literature (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch, 2007), and it measures MFIs’ ability to 
cover their costs through their operating revenue without external subsidy from donors. 
From the abovementioned theoretical analyses, it can be argued that MFIs will 
deteriorate their wide outreach or FSS to satisfy budget constraints as the competition 
intensifies. With regard to FSS, there has been no empirical analysis on the link between 
FSS and competition.  
This paper will provide a detailed empirical analysis of 450 socially-motivated MFIs 
in 71 countries, coping with the problem of endogeneity. Most studies conducted 
empirical analysis of both profit-motivated MFIs and socially-motivated MFIs at the 
same time. These analyses are not appropriate for examining the effect of competition on 
the poorest borrowers of socially-motivated MFIs, since profit-motivated MFIs who 
attempt to provide loans to wealthier borrowers are quite different from 
socially-motivated MFIs. Given that there has been controversy surrounding the effect of 
competition on wide outreach, econometric analysis solely on socially-motivated MFIs 
has not been conducted, and since there has not been any global empirical analysis in this 
regard, this research would be extremely insightful.  
 
 
2. Model 
 
To assess the relationship between competition, FSS, and wide outreach in 
socially-motivated MFIs, we used the panel data regression methodology following the 
recent empirical literature, such as Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) and 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007). Here, considering FSS and wide outreach are believed 
to be determined simultaneously, I have used the reduced form of regression. The 
empirical analysis is based on unbalanced panel data between 2003 and 2006 for 450 
socially-motivated MFIs in 71 countries, and the empirical specifications are as follows:  
 
Model 1           itiitiit eCCOMF ++++= μψβα ,                       (1) 
 
Model 2           itiititiiit eCACOMCOMF +++++= μψγβα )*( ,          (2) 
 
Model 3           itiitiit eCCOMAL ++++= μψβα ,                      (3) 
 
Model 4           itiititiiit eCACOMCOMAL +++++= μψγβα )*( ,         (4) 
 
where itF  denotes FSS; itAL , the loan-size per borrower as a proxy of wide-outreach; 
iCOM , the measure of competition intensity; itA , the MFI age; itC , a vector of control 
variables; iμ , the MFI fixed effect; and ite , the random disturbance ( i : MFI, t : time).  
Model 1 examines the effects of competition on FSS. In model 2, the interaction terms 
between competition intensity and MFI age are added to model 1 in order to examine the 
compound effect of competition and MFI age on FSS. Model 3 analyzes the effects of 
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competition on wide outreach. In model 4, the interaction terms between competition 
intensity and MFI age are added to model 3 in order to examine the compound effect of 
competition and MFI age on wide outreach. 
FSS indicates MFIs’ ability to cover their costs through their operating revenue 
without external subsidy such as grants and soft loan. It can be concluded that the higher 
FSS is, the lower the subsidy dependence is. Moreover, I have employed average loan 
size per borrower as an indicator of wide outreach, following literature such as Cull, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) and Olivares-Polanco (2005). Here, the larger the 
loan size is, the lower wide outreach is. 
A measure of competition intensity is included to assess the impact of competition on 
FSS and wide outreach. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) use the number of MFIs in the 
country as a measure of competition intensity, which does not consider the scale 
difference of microfinance markets among countries. Therefore I have used the following 
variable as a measure of competition intensity: the number of MFIs times the average 
number of clients divided by the number of potential borrowers in the country. I have 
used the female population aged 15–64 years as a proxy for potential borrowers, since 
most microfinance clients are women. On the basis of literature such as McIntosh and 
Wydick (2004) and Navajas, Conning, and Gonzales-Vega (2003), we can expect greater 
competition to be associated with lower FSS and lower wide outreach.   
The interaction term between competition and MFI age is included to determine if the 
competition-elasticity depends on MFI age. MFIs with longer experience are more likely 
to have a stable management through technology progress and market power, thus 
leading to less vulnerability to external shocks. We assume that the adverse effect of 
competition declines as MFIs increase in experience. 
Furthermore, the analysis includes control variables such as the cost and technology 
factors of MFIs and the macro environmental factors. First, the wages of MFI employees 
and the capital price of MFIs are included as cost factors. Since higher wages and capital 
price raises the costs of MFIs, MFIs need to reduce wide outreach or FSS to satisfy the 
budget constraint. The analysis expects a higher level of these cost factors to be 
correlated with lower wide outreach and lower FSS.  
Next, MFI size in terms of total assets, MFI age, and a capital-to-asset ratio are 
included as technology factors. Large-scale MFIs have a lower cost structure through 
scale economy, which enables them to improve wide outreach and FSS. On the other 
hand, since large-scale MFIs with higher financing ability can issue larger loans and 
attract wealthier borrowers, the analysis also expects larger MFI size to be associated 
with larger loan size per borrower. Moreover, it is assumed that MFIs with more 
experience have a lower cost structure through high information production and 
technology progress, which enables them to improve FSS or wide outreach. We can 
assume that wide outreach and FSS ascend as MFI age increases. However, it can be 
argued that clients can grow, and the average loan size can get larger as an MFI increases 
its experience, which lets the analysis expect larger loan size per borrower to be 
correlated with higher MFI age. Furthermore, since MFIs with a higher capital-to-asset 
ratio attempt to improve their financial performance for investors, we expect a higher 
capital-to-asset ratio to be associated with higher FSS. 
 The analysis also includes population density and financial depth in terms of 
M2-to-GDP ratio as macro environmental factors. We assume that FSS and wide outreach 
will improve with higher population density because higher population density makes 
MFI operation easier and thus creates a lower cost structure. Moreover, since financial 
deepening eases credit constraints on the poor (World Bank, 2001; Jalilian and 
Kirkpatrick, 2002; Kai and Hamori, 2009), we expect financial depth to be correlated 
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with higher wide outreach.  
 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
 
The Hausman test is conducted to select an empirical model. The test result indicates that 
individual effects are correlated with regressors, leading us to choose the fixed effect 
model over the random effect model. However, since the measure of competition 
intensity is only available for 2006, we apply a Hausman and Taylor (1981) approach to 
deal with the correlation between individual effects and the regressors following the 
previous literature such as Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007).  
Time-variant exogenous variables that are not found to be correlated with unobserved 
effects are wage, capital price, and financial depth, while the time-invariant exogenous 
variable is population density. It should be considered that population density fluctuation 
over four years from 2003 to 2006 substantially depends on the birth rate in developing 
countries and is not likely to affect MFIs’ performance fluctuation. Rather, FSS and wide 
outreach are more likely to be affected by cross-country comparison than fluctuation 
over the years, owing to which I employed population density as a time-invariant 
variable. Time-variant endogenous variables that are found to be correlated with the 
unobserved effect are MFI size, MFI age, and a capital-to-asset ratio. Furthermore, 
competition intensity is a time-invariant endogenous variable identified to be correlated 
with the observed effect. Newcomer MFIs attempt to enter the market on the basis of 
location characteristics such as high preexisting MFI penetration, and their entry location 
is considered as endogenous (McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2005). It can be argued 
that profit-motivated MFIs enter the market where there are superior MFIs and the clients 
are already well trained and screened. Therefore, competition intensity is considered to 
be correlated with individual effects.  
 
 
4. Data 
 
The data for the analysis comprises unbalanced panel data for 450 socially-motivated 
MFIs from 71 countries from 2003 to 2006, obtained from The Microfinance Information 
eXchange, Inc (MIX). MIX provides the largest amount of high-quality MFI financial 
data. The analysis uses its highest quality rank data. Moreover, the data on the number of 
MFIs in the country is obtained from The Microcredit Summit Campaign†. Furthermore, 
the female population (aged 15–64 years) and population density data that I employ is 
from 2006, and it is obtained from the World Development Indicators published by the 
World Bank. The definition and summary statistics are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 shows the regression results of models 1 and 2. The first column displays the 
result of model 1, and the second column shows the result of model 2. The results 
indicate that the competition intensity measures are not significant in columns (a) and (b). 
These results are not consistent with our prediction that MFIs will reduce FSS as 
competition intensifies. Moreover, the result shows that the coefficient on the interaction 
                                                  
† Because of the availability of data, the number of MFI in the country is from 2007. 
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between competition and MFI age is not significant, indicating that the 
competition-elasticity of FSS does not depend on MFI age.  
With regard to control variables, capital price and capital-to-asset ratio are significant 
in both column (a) and (b), and MFI age is significant in column (a), which is consistent 
with our prediction. It is observed that MFIs with more experience create higher FSS by 
taking advantage of technological progress. The results also indicate that a higher 
capital-to-asset ratio leads to higher FSS. It can be argued that MFIs with a higher 
capital-to-asset ratio improve FSS for investors.  
Next, Table 3 displays the regression results of models 3 and 4. The first column 
displays the result of model 3, and the second column shows the result of model 4. The 
results show that the competition intensity measures are significantly positive at the 1% 
level in both columns. Our results indicate that intense competition results in 
deterioration of wide outreach, which supports the finding of McIntosh and Wydick 
(2004). Moreover, the result indicates that the coefficient on the interaction between 
competition and MFI age is significantly negative at the 1% level in column (b), which 
shows that although intense competition reduces wide outreach, its effect declines as 
MFIs increase experience. It can be argued that since MFIs with more experience can 
cope well with a changing competitive environment by taking advantage of technological 
progress and market power, they are able to reduce wide outreach less than 
less-experienced MFIs through competition. 
With regard to control variables, wage, MFI size, and population density are 
significant in both columns (a) and (b), and financial depth and MFI age are significant 
in column (b), which is consistent with our prediction. It is found that large-scale MFIs 
loan to wealthier borrowers. Furthermore, the result indicates that MFIs with longer 
periods experience results in larger loan size per borrower. It can be argued that clients 
increase their loan size as MFIs increase experience, leading to a further increase in loan 
size. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Recent intense competition in the microfinance market has been expected to have a 
negative impact on the poorest clients of socially-motivated MFIs. However, we lack 
sufficient research data for empirical analysis in this field. The empirical results of 
previous literature are controversial, and a much more detailed analysis is required. Most 
previous literature conducts empirical analysis on profit-motivated MFIs and 
socially-motivated MFIs together, and it does not focus solely on the effect of 
competition on the poorest borrowers of socially-motivated MFIs, although this has been 
analyzed theoretically. This paper conducted inclusive empirical analysis on the impact 
of intense competition on FSS and wide outreach of socially-motivated MFIs. This 
analysis is the first detailed research targeting socially-motivated MFIs in a large number 
of developing countries across the world. 
The main results of the empirical analysis in this paper are as follows: 
 
(1) Competition does not have a significant impact on FSS. 
(2) Competition reduces wide outreach. 
(3) This negative impact of competition on wide outreach declines as MFIs increase 
experience.  
 
As such, it could not be found that MFIs worsen FSS or increase subsidy dependence 
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as competition intensifies. However, our empirical results found that intense competition 
leads to poorer borrowers dropping out of the market. Our theoretical analysis predicted 
that competition would make MFIs reduce wide outreach or FSS to satisfy their budget 
constraints, since intense competition has a negative impact on the profits and 
cross-subsidization of MFIs. Our empirical results show that MFIs cope with the 
negative impact of competition not by reducing FSS but by limiting wide outreach. Thus, 
it is found that MFIs do not increase external subsidy‡, but exclude the poorest borrowers 
as competition intensifies. Moreover, the more experience MFIs have, the less wide 
outreach is reduced by competition. It can be argued that the more experienced MFIs take 
advantage of market power and technological progress and become less vulnerable to the 
changing competitive environments. 
Competition has a positive impact since it prompts technology innovation and makes 
wealthier clients better off through a decline in interest rates. For the development of the 
microfinance market, entry regulation is not appropriate. However, we need to seriously 
consider the adverse effects of competition. In order to prevent the poorest borrowers 
from dropping out of the market, governments and donors need to increase subsidies for 
socially-motivated MFIs (targeting the poorest borrowers) based on the degree of 
competition and the operation age of MFIs. This can be supported by various studies 
which show that subsidy for MFIs has higher benefits than cost through cost-benefit 
analysis (Townsend and Yaron, 2001; Khandker, 2003). In the competitive environment, 
subsidy for MFIs enables the poor to borrow from MFIs and conduct economic activities, 
which increases their assets and productivity, and hence contributes to poverty reduction. 
Socially-motivated MFIs also need to offer more attractive loan services to secure 
profitable borrowers to maintain their wide outreach. There has been a global consensus 
that MFIs should achieve outreach and FSS simultaneously. However, this objective for 
MFIs needs to be rectified. If we operate microfinance as a tool for poverty reduction, we 
might need to permit the reduction of FSS to maintain wide outreach.  
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Variable Definition Mean StandardDeviation
Financial Self-Sufficiency(FSS) Adjusted Financial Revenue / Adjusted (Financial Expense +
Impairment Losses on Loans +Operating Expense)
:Indicate MFIs' ability to cover their costs through their operating
revenue without external subsidy such as grants and soft loans.
1.0388 0.3196
Average Loan-Size Loan-Size per borrower / GNP per capita
＊Use average loan-size as a measure of wide-outreach
The larger loan size is, the lower the wide-outreach is
0.4888 0.5733
Competition Intensity 3 Ranks from 1 to 3
Based on the following value:  the number of MFIs times the average
number of clients divided by the number of potential borrowers in the
country
:1 for low, 2 for medium and 3 for high
＊Use the female population aged 15–64 years as a proxy for potential
borrowers
1.2004 0.4249
Wage Average personal expence of MFI employees / GNP per capita 5.1045 4.1897
Capital Price Administrative expense / Total assets 0.0904 0.0824
MFI Size 3 Ranks from 1 to 3
Based on the following value: logarighm of total assets divided by GNP
per capita
:1 for small, 2 for medium and 3 for large
1.2284 0.5316
Logarithm of MFI Age Logarithm of Years functioning as an MFI 2.1880 0.6657
Capital to Asset Ratio Total equity / Total assets 0.4081 0.2855
Logarithm of Population Density Logarithm of population density 4.2044 1.0655
Financial Depth Money and quasi money(M2) as % of  GDP 0.4365 0.2866
Table 1 Definition and Summary Statistics
Source;
Number of MFIs in the country: Microcredit Summit Campaign (http://www.microcreditsummitt.org)
Women Population (aged 15 – 64 years) and Population Density;World Development Indicators(WDI)
Others: The Microfinance Information eXchange. Inc（MIX）   
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Table 2  Empirical Results for Model 1 and Model 2
Dependent Variable: FSS
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Competition intensity -0.2468 0.324 -0.4417 0.322
Interaction between competition
intensity
and Logarithm of MFI age
0.0713 0.596
Wage 0.0053 0.190 0.0050 0.220
Capital price -1.2739 0.000 -1.2810 0.000
MFI size 0.0189 0.565 0.0167 0.616
Logarithm of MFI age 0.1234 0.007 0.0438 0.780
Capital to asset ratio 0.1311 0.082 0.1272 0.095
Logarithm of population density 0.0197 0.430 0.0228 0.379
Financial depth 0.0180 0.777 0.0208 0.748
cons 0.9802 0.000 1.1914 0.014
Number of Observations 889 889
Number of Groups 450 450
F ratio 0.000 0.000
Hausman 0.986 0.997
(b)
Variables
(a)
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Table 3  Empirical Results for Model 3 and Model 4
Dependent Variable: The loan-size per borrower
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Competition intensity 1.5282 0.000 2.4578 0.000
Interaction between competition
intensity
and Logarithm of MFI age
-0.3376 0.002
Wage 0.0298 0.000 0.0291 0.000
Capital price -0.0756 0.704 -0.0598 0.760
MFI size 0.0785 0.003 0.0883 0.001
Logarithm of MFI age -0.0196 0.596 0.3558 0.004
Capital to asset ratio -0.0393 0.524 -0.0260 0.669
Logarithm of population density -0.2293 0.000 -0.2482 0.000
Financial depth -0.2211 0.131 -0.2566 0.097
cons -0.5020 0.292 -1.4675 0.014
Number of Observations 889 889
Number of Groups 450 450
F ratio 0.000 0.000
Hausman 0.984 0.998
(b)
Variables
(a)
 
